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Abstract
In this paper we examine the role played by heterogeneity in the popular “con-
nections model” of Jackson andWolinsky (1996). We prove that under heterogeneity
in values or decay involving only two degrees of freedom, all networks can supported
as Nash. Moreover, we show that Nash networks may not always exist. In the ab-
sence of decay, neither result can be found in a model with value heterogeneity.
Finally, we show that on reducing heterogeneity, both the earlier “anything goes”
result and the non-existence problem disappear.
JEL Classification: C72, D85.
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1 Introduction
The connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is one of the most popular
models in network theory. In this model an agent acquires information from all the
agents she is directly or indirectly linked to and pays a fixed cost for all her direct
links. However, the model allows for partial transitivity of resources that an agent
obtains. First, the information she obtains from her direct links is weighted by a
decay parameter. Indirect links yield still lower benefits in the following manner –
from those who are two links away the information is weighted by the square of the
decay parameter, from those three links away by its cube, and so on. Since informa-
tion loses value as it travels along a sequence of links, the decay parameter captures
the idea that “it is better to have the facts straight from the horse’s mouth.” Bala
and Goyal (2000) studied Nash as well as strict Nash networks for the homogeneous
(values, costs of link formation and decay) parameters version of this model.1
In this paper we introduce heterogeneity in the model by first allowing for value
heterogeneity, keeping the link cost as well as the decay parameter same for all
links. A second version of the model allows for heterogeneity in the decay parame-
ter while keeping values and costs constant across all links. Heterogeneity of players
and links arise quite naturally in information networks. For example, some indi-
viduals are better informed which makes them more valuable as contacts. This can
be understood as heterogeneity of players in the model. Similarly the extent of
the communication between pairs of individuals can vary, since it is often easier to
communicate with some individuals than with some others. Thus the amount of
1A decay model for Nash networks has recently been analyzed by Hojman and Szeidl (2008). In
this model, costs of links are homogeneous and linear, while the benefit function is quite general. The
authors assume that the benefit function is strictly increasing and concave. Moreover, the benefits from
links further away go to zero at some threshold level of distance. The authors find that Nash networks
tend to have a core-periphery structure. Due to the nature of their payoff function however, we are
unable to compare our results with them. Instead, we restrict attention to the papers mentioned in the
introduction which utilize the linear payoff specification of Bala and Goyal (2000).
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information acquired will depend on the link(s) through which it travels, allowing
us to model this as link heterogeneity. The paper studies the existence and charac-
terization of (strict) Nash networks for these two types of heterogeneity.
Heterogeneity in Nash networks has been studied by Galeotti, Goyal and Kam-
phorst (2006) and Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi (2007). Both these models in-
vestigate the consequences of heterogeneity for the full transitivity (or no decay)
model of Nash networks with homogeneous parameters introduced to the literature
by Bala and Goyal. In the Bala and Goyal model with no decay, each agent pays
only for her direct links and is able to acquire the full value of information of all
agents she is directly or indirectly linked to. Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi intro-
duce heterogeneity in the value and cost parameters to study the existence of Nash
networks. Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst also introduce heterogeneity in values
and costs but focus on the characterization of strict Nash networks.
The contribution of this paper to the literature can be summarized in the follow-
ing manner. When decay and costs are homogeneous while the link between player
i and player j provides value Vi,j to player i we find that:
1. Nash networks may not always exist. This is in sharp contrast to Haller,
Kamphorst and Sarangi who find that in models of full transitivity, value
heterogeneity does not lead to non-existence. Non-existence occurs only with
cost heterogeneity. However, if we reduce heterogeneity by allowing Vi,j =
Vi, then it turns out that Nash networks always exist. This result is also
interesting for another reason. As a corollary it tells us that Nash networks
always exist in the homogeneous parameters model of Bala and Goyal (2000)
− an issue that these authors had left unresolved in their paper.
2. All networks can be supported as strict Nash networks. This result echoes
the full transitivity model of Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst with cost het-
erogeneity which shows that strict Nash networks must be minimal as well as
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its converse.2 We know that under full transitivity (regardless of parameters
values) with costly link formation, the set of potential strict Nash networks3
consists of networks without any links that do not provide access to new play-
ers. With cost heterogeneity, Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst show that the
set of strict Nash networks coincides with the set of potential strict Nash net-
works, i.e., the equilibrium set is maximal. We find that the same is true in
our model. Hence with partial transitivity value heterogeneity functions like
cost heterogeneity with full transitivity.
3. In general, we find that when we reduce the magnitude of heterogeneity or set
Vi,j = Vi, the “anything goes” results disappear. Moreover, in this case we
find that strict Nash networks must contain only one component. However,
unlike Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst where all players must belong to some
component, isolated players can exist in our model.
The model with heterogeneous decay and homogeneous cost and values yields
similar results. Therefore these results are presented very briefly in the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 presents the results on Nash networks in models with decay and hetero-
geneity.
2 Model Setup
In this section we define the formal elements of the strategic form network formation
game. Let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 3, denote the set of players with generic elements
i, j, k.
Strategies. For player i a pure strategy is a vector gi = (gi,1, . . . , gi,i−1, gi,i+1,
. . . , gi,n) ∈ {0, 1}n−1. Since our aim is to model network formation, gi,j = 1 implies
2Minimal networks consist of components without any links that do not provide access to new players.
3That is the set of networks such that there exist parameters which allow these networks to be Nash.
4
that there exists a direct link between i and j initiated by player i; this link is
denoted by i j. If gi,j = 0, then i does not initiate a link with j. Regardless of what
player i does, player j can always choose to initiate a link with i or set gj,i = 0.
Here we focus only on pure strategies. The set of all pure strategies of player i is
denoted by Gi and consists of 2n−1 elements. The joint strategy space is given by
G = G1 × · · · × Gn. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between G and
the set of all simple directed graphs (that is graphs with no loops and there is at
most one directed link from a player i to a player j) or networks with vertex set N .
Namely, to a strategy profile g = (g1, . . . , gn) ∈ G corresponds the graph (N,E(g))
where E(g) is the set of links which satisfies i j ∈ E(g) iff gi,j = 1. In the sequel,
we identify a joint strategy g by its corresponding graph and use the terminology
directed graph or network g for it.
Network definitions. The closure of g, denoted by g ∈ G, is defined by
gi,j = max {gi,j , gj,i} for i %= j. The closure of g is thus the undirected counter-part
of g. If gi,j = 1, then there is a non-directed link between player i and player j;
this non-directed link is denoted by [i j]. A path of length m in g ∈ G from player i
to player j %= i, is a finite sequence i0, i1, . . . , im of distinct players such that i0 = i,
im = j, and gik,ik+1 = 1 for k = 0, . . . ,m−1. We define a chain of length m between
player k and player j, j %= k by replacing gj!,j!+1 = 1 by gj!,j!+1 = 1. Let Ci,j(g)
be the set of chains between i and j in the network g, and let Ci,j(g) be a typical
element of Ci,j(g). To simplify we say that the non-directed link [! !′] belongs to a
chain Ci,j(g) if players ! and !′ belong to the chain and g!,!′ = 1. A network g is
connected if there is a chain in g between all players i, j ∈ N . Given a network g, we
define a component, D(g), as a set of players such that there is a chain between any
two players who belong to D(g), and there does not exist a chain between a player
in D(g) and a player who does not belong to D(g). We do not consider isolated
players (players who do not form and receive any links) as components. A network
g is connected if it contains only one component which consists of all players. It is
minimally connected if it is not possible to preserve connectivity whenever a link
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is removed. A network is minimal if every component is minimally connected. A
network g is called a star if there is a vertex is, such that for all j %= is, gis,j = 1
and for all k %∈ {is, j}, gk,j = 0. Moreover a star, where gis,j = 1 for all j %= is
is a center-sponsored star. Finally, a network g ∈ G is essential if gi,j = 1 implies
gj,i = 0.
Payoffs. Payoffs of player i are given by the difference between benefits Bi(g)
and costs ci(g). Hence the payoff of player i in network g is given by
ui(g) = Bi(g)− ci(g). (1)
Next we define two types of heterogeneity in networks by introducing costs and
different benefit formulations.
(i) Link Costs. Players incur costs only for the links they establish. The cost
of each link is assumed to be the same, and the cost of forming links for player i is
given by:
ci(g) =
∑
j #=i
gi,jc, (2)
with c > 0. In this paper we only use homogeneous costs. Note that in our con-
text heterogeneous costs would not improve anything because (i) they would only
increase the set of potential strict Nash networks, and (ii) they would weaken the
possibility of existence of Nash networks. This issue is discussed in detail in subse-
quent sections of the paper (see also Galeotti et al., 2006 for more on this).
(ii) Link Benefits. In the Nash networks setting, decay models were analyzed
by Bala and Goyal (2000) who assumed that the value of information, the costs of
link formation, and the decay parameter were identical across all players and links.
In other words, they analyzed the case of homogeneous decay. Here we propose two
different frameworks to study the interaction between heterogeneity and decay.
We denote byNi(g) = {i}∪{j ∈ N\{i} | there exists a chain in g between i and j},
the set of players that player i can access or “observe” in network g. Since player
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i can obtain resources from a player j with whom she is linked due to the chain, it
follows that there is two-way flow of information.
Decay with Heterogeneous Players. Here we use the homogeneous decay
assumption in conjunction with the heterogeneous players framework of Galeotti,
Goyal and Kamphorst (2006). Information received from j is worth Vi,j ≥ 0 to
player i. Let VM = max(i,j)∈N×N{Vi,j} and V m = min(i,j)∈N×N{Vi,j}. The bene-
fits function can be written as:
Bi(g) =
∑
j∈Ni(g)
δdi,j(g)Vi,j (3)
where δ is the decay parameter and di,j(g) is the geodesic distance in the shortest
chain between i and j in g. We set di,j(g) = ∞ if there is no chain between i and
j in g.
Decay with Heterogeneous Links. In this model we capture the fact that
the quantity of information a link can convey is not the same across all links under
decay. In other words, some channels of information or chains are “better” than
others.
We measure decay associated with a link i j by the parameter δi,j ∈ [0, 1]. For
this model we retain the symmetry assumption, that is δi,j = δj,i. Without loss of
generality we assume that the value of the resources of each player V = 1. Given a
network g, it is assumed that if player i has formed a link with player j, then she
receives information of value δi,j from j. The benefits of player i in the network g
is then given by:
Bi(g) =
∑
j∈Ni(g)
 ∏
[! k]∈C∗i,j(g)
δ!,k
 , (4)
where C∗i,j(g) = argmaxCi,j(g)∈Ci,j(g)
{∏
[! k]∈Ci,j(g) δ!,k
}
.
Note that this expression fundamentally differs from the previous one because
it does not use the geodesic distance between players to determine the value of in-
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formation obtained.
Observe that in the model with heterogeneous decay, the amount of information
that passes through a link between any two players depends on the identity of the
players. On the other hand, with heterogeneous values the links between all players
have the ability to convey the same amount of information, but the value that is
acquired through a link now depends on the identity of the players.
Nash Networks. Given a network g ∈ G, let g−i denote the network that
remains when all of player i’s links have been removed. Clearly, g = gi ⊕ g−i,
where the symbol ⊕ indicates that g is composed of the union of links in gi and
g−i (similarly the symbol ) is used to indicate removal of links). A strategy gi is
a best response of player i to g−i if
ui(gi ⊕ g−i) ≥ ui(g′i ⊕ g−i), for all g′i ∈ Gi.
Let BRi(g−i) denote the set of player i’s best responses to g−i. A network g =
(g1, . . . , gn) is said to be a Nash network if gi ∈ BRi(g−i) for each i ∈ N . We define
a strict best response and a strict Nash network by replacing “≥” with “>”. Note
that if g ∈ G is a Nash network, then it must be essential. This follows from the
fact that each link is costly, and allows for two-way flow of information regardless
of who initiates (and pays for) the link.
3 Results
In this section we investigate Nash networks in the connections model with hetero-
geneity.
3.1 Decay with Heterogeneous Players
In this section we first examine the existence of Nash networks, then we characterize
strict Nash networks.
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I. Existence of Nash networks. Existence of Nash networks in two-way flow
models with decay has not been studied before in the literature. We know that the
introduction of full heterogeneity on the costs of setting links without any decay
can lead to non existence of Nash networks (see Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi,
2007). Hence, we introduce heterogeneity in stages. We begin by showing that if
heterogeneity is not “too high”, more precisely if Vi,j = Vi for all i ∈ N , then a
Nash network always exists. It follows that there always exists a Nash network in
the model of Bala and Goyal (2000).
Proposition 1 If the benefits function satisfies equation (3) and, for all i ∈ N ,
Vi,j = Vi, for all j ∈ N \ {i}, then a Nash network always exists.
Proof. Let Z0 = {j ∈ N | δVj ≥ c} be the set of players who have an incentive to
form a link with any player j with whom they are not (indirectly) linked; and let
z be the maximal value player, that is the player such that Vz ≥ Vi for all i ∈ N .
Moreover, let Z1 = {j ∈ N | (δ − δ2)Vj ≥ c} be the set of players who have an
incentive to form a link with any player j with whom they are not directly linked.
Clearly if Z1 %= ∅, then z ∈ Z1. Further if Z1 = ∅, then no player i will form a link
with a player j in g whenever di,j(g) ≤ 2. If Z0 = ∅, then the empty network is a
Nash network. If Z0 %= ∅ and Z1 = ∅, then we let player z form links with all other
players. We obtain a center-sponsored star, gcs, which is a Nash network. Indeed,
the distance between all players i ∈ N \ {z} and j ∈ N \ {z, i} is 2 in gcs and we
know that Z1 = ∅. It follows that no player i ∈ N \ {z} has an incentive to form
a link with j ∈ N \ {z, i} in gcs. If Z0 %= ∅ and Z1 %= ∅, then we create network g
where player z forms links with all other players and where gj,i = 0 implies gi,j = 1
for all i ∈ Z1 and for all j ∈ N \ {z}. Clearly, g is Nash since player z ∈ Z1 has no
incentive to delete one of her links, each player i ∈ Z1 has no incentive to delete any
link by construction and no player i′ %∈ Z1 has any incentive to form an additional
link (otherwise she would belong to Z1). It follows that a Nash network always
exists.
9
!Although Bala and Goyal (2000) are able to provide a partial characterization of
strict Nash networks in the model with decay and homogeneous parameters model,
they do not tackle the existence question. Existence of strict Nash networks in the
homogeneous parameters model with decay is now an obvious corollary of Proposi-
tion 1.
Corollary 1 Let the payoff function be the one given in Bala and Goyal (2000,
pg.1210). Then a Nash network always exists.
Proposition 2 If the benefits function satisfies equation (3), then a Nash network
does not always exist.
Proof. The proof is given through an example. Let N = {1, . . . , 5} be the set of
players, and assume that:
1. V1,2
(
δ − δ4) + V1,3(δ2 − δ3) > c, δV1,3 < δV1,2 < c, and for all j %= 2, δV1,j +
δ2
∑
k #=j V1,k < c.
2. V2,3
(
δ − δ4)+ V2,4(δ2 − δ3) < c, δV2,3 + δ2V2,4 + δ3V2,5 + δ4V2,1 > c, and for
all j %= 3, δV2,j + δ2
∑
k #=j V2,k < c.
3. (δ − δ2)V3,4 > c and δ
∑
k #=4 V3,k + δ
2V3,4 < c.
4. (δ − δ2)V4,5 > c and δ
∑
k #=5 V4,k + δ
2V4,5 < c.
5. (δ − δ2)V5,1 > c and δ
∑
k #=1 V5,k + δ
2V5,1 < c.
These five points provide a list of the players with whom the others have no incen-
tives to form links, as well as those with whom they would like to form links. For
example, item 1 implies that player 1 will never form a link with players 3, 4 and 5.
Moreover, a Nash network must contain the links 3 4, 4 5, 5 1. From all of this, it
follows that there are four possible Nash networks: E(g1) = (3 4, 4 5, 5 1, 1 2, 2 3),
E(g2) = (3 4, 4 5, 5 1, 1 2), E(g3) = (3 4, 4 5, 5 1), E(g4) = (3 4, 4 5, 5 1, 2 3). We
know from item 2 that player 2 prefers the network g2 to the network g1, so g1 is
not Nash. Likewise, player 1 prefers the network g3 to the network g2 by point 1,
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so g2 is not Nash. Player 2 prefers the network g4 to the network g3 by point 2, so
g3 is not Nash. Finally, by point 1, player 1 prefers the network g1 to the network
g4. Hence g4 is not Nash. !
This result provides an interesting comparison with the findings of Haller, Kam-
phorst and Sarangi (2007). The authors show that in the model with no decay,
value heterogeneity (and homogeneous cost) does not lead to non existence (2007,
Proposition, pg.602) while cost heterogeneity does (2007, Example 2, pg.602). By
contrast however in a model with homogeneous costs and decay, Proposition 2 shows
that value heterogeneity can lead to non-existence.
II. Characterization of Strict Nash networks. We begin by showing that
the introduction of player heterogeneity dramatically increases the set of strict Nash
networks.
Theorem 1 Let g be an essential network. If the benefits function satisfies equation
(3), then there exist a link cost c > 0, a decay δ ∈ (0, 1), and an array V = [Vi,j ] of
values such that g is a strict Nash network in the corresponding network formation
game.
Proof. Suppose g is an essential network. Let V 1 = 1, c = (n− 3/2)/n2, δ = 1/n,
V 0 = 1/(3n). We construct a symmetric n × n-matrix [Vi,j ] of value as follows. If
i %= j and i and j are linked, i.e. gi,j = 1 or gj,i = 1 set Vi,j = V 1. Otherwise
set Vi,j = V 0. Now consider i %= j. Let gi,j = 0. Then, either gj,i = 1 or
gj,i = 0. In the first case, agent i receives zero marginal benefits but incurs an
additional positive cost when forming the link i j. It follows that gi,j = 0 is the
unique optimal choice for i given g−i. For gj,i = 0, Vi,j = V 0 = 1/(3n). If
player i forms a link with j, then she obtains at most marginal benefits equal to
δV 0 + (n − 2)δ2V 1. We show that δV 0 < c − (n − 2)δ2V 1. We have δV 0 =
1/(3n2) < 1/(2n2) = (n − 3/2)/n2 − (n − 2)/n2 = c − (n − 2)δ2V 1. Therefore
regardless of other links, not initiating the link i j is optimal for agent i. Now let
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gi,j = 1. Then by essentiality of g, gj,i = 0. Further, Vi,j = V 1. If player i removes
the link i j, then she obtains at most a payoff equal to δ2Vi,j from player j. It
follows that due to the link i j player i obtains marginal benefits equal to at least
V 1(δ − δ2) = 1/n− 1/n2 = (n− 1)/n2 > (n− (3/2))/n2 = c. Therefore regardless
of other links, player i has no incentive to remove the link i j. !
From the above proposition we can establish two things. First, consider the
following quote from Galeotti et al. (2006, pg. 360): “This shows that, in case of
general cost heterogeneity, the level of value heterogeneity plays no important role
in determining the network architecture.” This observation is not true for models
with decay where regardless of the level of cost heterogeneity, value heterogeneity
is important for determining the network architecture.
The second point is about how the role value heterogeneity in a model of partial
transitivity compares to the role cost heterogeneity in a model with full transitiv-
ity. We know that value heterogeneity with homogeneous cost and no decay leads
to strict Nash networks which are either the empty network, or minimal networks
in which every (non-singleton) component is a center-sponsored star (see Galeotti
et al., 2006, Proposition 3.1, pg.359). We also know that under cost heterogene-
ity and homogeneous value every minimal network can be supported as a strict
Nash equilibrium in the absence of decay (see Galeotti et al., 2006, Proposition 3.2,
pg.360). Since there is no decay, this model allows for full transitivity in information
acquisition. Consequently, every strict Nash network must be minimal regardless
of parameter value. Thus Proposition 3.2 of Galeotti et al. identifies the largest
permissible set of networks as strict Nash networks. The introduction of (homoge-
neous) decay however leads to partial transitivity in the model. In this situation, we
find that value heterogeneity alone has the potential to make every network strict
Nash, which coincides with the largest permissible set of networks. To borrow from
Galeotti et al., value heterogeneity “... is important in shaping both the level of
connectedness as well as the architecture of individual components.” Thus, in a
model of decay, value heterogeneity plays the same role as cost heterogeneity in a
model with full transitivity.
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With homogeneous players, strict Nash networks are either empty or connected
(see Bala and Goyal, 2000). A natural question that arises in the context of the
heterogeneous players model is when can such a result be found for this model? We
show next that with heterogeneous values it is possible to obtain this result if the
values of players are sufficiently close.
Proposition 3 Suppose benefits function satisfies equation (3) and that VM −
V m < δV m/(1 + (n − 3)δ). Then a strict Nash network is either empty or con-
nected.
Proof. Let D∗(g, i j) be the set of players ! ∈ N \ {i, j} such that the shortest
chain between i and ! goes through the link i j in g. Consider a strict Nash network
g. Suppose g is neither empty nor connected. Then there exist three agents i, j
and k such that i and j belong to one connected component D1 and k belongs to
a different component D2 in g. Moreover, wlog let gi,j = 1. Then the incremental
benefits to player i of having the direct link to j is given by:
∆M = (δ − δdi,j(g'i j))Vi,j +
∑
!∈D∗(g,i j)
(
δdi,!(g) − δdi,!(g'i j))Vi,!
≤ δVi,j +
∑
!∈D∗(g,i j) δ
di,!(g)Vi,!
≤ δVM +∑!∈D∗(g,i j) δdi,!(g)VM
with the convention δdi,!(g'i j) = 0, if ! %∈ Ni(g ) i j). Clearly, we have ∆M ≥ c.
If player k forms a link with player j, then the incremental benefits to player i
of having the direct link to j is:
∆m ≥ δVk,j + δ2Vk,i +
∑
!∈D∗(g,i j) δ
di,!(g)Vk,!
≥ δV m + δ2V m +∑!∈D∗(g,i j) δdi,!(g)V m.
It is worth noting that:∑
!∈D∗(g,i j)
δdi,!(g)VM −
∑
!∈D∗(g,i j)
δdi,!(g)V m ≤ (n− 3)δ2(VM − V m).
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Since VM − V m < δV m/(1 + (n − 3)δ), we have ∆m > ∆M ≥ c. It follows that
player k has a incentive to form a link with j and g is not strict Nash. !
Not surprisingly Proposition 3 also tells us that in the homogeneous parameters
model with decay not every network can be supported as a strict Nash network.
Indeed, it is easy to see that VM − V m < δV m/(1 + (n− 3)δ) is always satisfied in
the homogeneous model. Therefore, non-connected networks cannot be strict Nash.
In the above proposition we restrict heterogeneity by putting a bound on its
magnitude. Now we restrict the heterogeneity by assuming that Vi,j = Vi. Recall
that reducing heterogeneity in this manner has positive implications for the existence
of Nash networks. Below we show how it affects the set of strict Nash networks.
Proposition 4 Suppose payoff function satisfies equation (3) and for each player
i ∈ N , Vi,j = Vi for all j ∈ N . Then a strict Nash network contains at most one
component.
Proof. Suppose g is a strict Nash network and contains two components D and
D′. Let i, j ∈ D and i′, j′ ∈ D′ be such that gi,j = gi′,j′ = 1 and Vi ≥ Vi′ . Let
g0 = g) i′ j′, A = {! ∈ Ni′(g)|di′,!(g) < di′,!(g0)} and B = {! ∈ Ni′(g)|di′,!(g−i′ ⊕
i′ j′) = di
′,!(g0)}. We have:
∆i′ = ui′(g)− ui′(g0) =
∑
!∈A(δ
di
′,!(g) − δdi′,!(g0))Vi′ − c,
with the convention δdi′,!(g
0) = 0, if ! %∈ Ni(g0). Since g is strict Nash, we have
∆i′ > 0.
Let g1 = g ⊕ i j′, we have:
∆i = ui(g1)− ui(g) =
∑
!∈A δ
di
′,!(g)Vi +
∑
!∈B∪{i′} δ
di
′,!(g)Vi
+
∑
!∈Ni′ (g)\(A∪B)(δ
di
′,!(g)+1)Vi − c
Since g is strict Nash, we have∆i < 0. We obtain a contradiction since∆i′ ≤ ∆i.
!
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Proposition 4 shows that when we reduce the heterogeneity by restricting player
i to acquire Vi from each of the players she observes, not every essential network
can be strict Nash. This sharply contrasts with the heterogeneous players case of
Theorem 1. Moreover, the model where values are given by Vi allows for strict
Nash networks that never arise in the homogeneous parameters model. Indeed, we
know by Proposition 3 that with low value heterogeneity (with the homogeneous
decay model being the limiting case) non-empty strict Nash networks contain one
component, say D, and all players belong to D. In the following example, we show
that when values are given by Vi, in a strict Nash network isolated players can also
co-exist with a single component.
Example 1 Consider N = {1, . . . , 5}, Vi = 1 for all i ∈ N \ {5} and V5 = ε. We
suppose that 4ε < δ < c, and δ + 2δ2 > c. Then the network g drawn in Figure 1
is a strict Nash network.
5
1 2 3
4
Figure 1: Network g
3.2 Decay with Heterogeneous Links
In this section we consider situations where players have homogeneous values while
the decay through each link is different.
I. Existence of Nash networks.
Proposition 5 Suppose the benefits function satisfies equation (4), then a Nash
network does not always exist.
Proof. The proof is given through a counter-example. Let N = {1, 2, 21, 3, 31, ..,
36, 4, 41} be the set of players. We assume that c = 0.95, δ1,2 = δ2,1 = 0.4,
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δ1,4 = δ4,1 = 0.319, δ4,3 = δ3,4 = 0.14, δ2,3 = δ3,2 = 0.1303, δ2,21 = δ21,2 = 1,
δ4,41 = δ41,4 = 1, δ3,k = δk,3 = 1, for all k ∈ {31, . . . , 36}, and δi,j = 0 for all re-
maining (i, j) ∈ N×N \{i}. Obviously, none of the links with δi,j = 0 will be estab-
lished, and all links i j such that δi,j = 1 will be established. From this observation
we know that in a Nash network g we have g2,21 = g3,31 = . . . = g3,36 = g4,41 = 1.
For candidate Nash networks, we consider the set A containing the following links:
{2 21, 3 31, . . . , 3 36, 4 41}. Although links 21 2, 31 3, ... are possible for the ar-
guments used below, the non existence result is not affected by them. Therefore
without loss of generality we focus on the set A. Moreover, straightforward com-
putations allow us to conclude that player 3 forms no links except with players
31, . . . , 36, players 2 and 4 cannot form a link with player 1. Similarly, it can be
checked that player 1 will not form a link with player 3. Likewise, player 2 and
player 4 will not form links with each other. In addition to the set of links in A, it
follows that the links that can be formed by players in a Nash network also belong
to the set B = {1 2, 1 4, 2 3, 4 3}. Therefore, the set of potential Nash networks
consists of networks for which the edge set is a subset of A ∪ B. In Figure 2 each
box contains the links associated with δ = 1. The other links are associated with
the non-zero values of δ.
1. Let g0 be a network such that E(g0) = A. Then g0 is not Nash since player
4 has an incentive to form a link with player 3.
2. We are now interested in networks which have |A| + 1 links. Straightforward
computations show that only g1, with E(g1) = A ∪ {4 3} is candidate to be
Nash. Indeed, in other networks with |A|+ 1 links, the player who forms the
additional link has no incentive to maintain it. Network g1 is not Nash since
player 1 has an incentive to form a link with player 4.
3. We are now interested in networks which have |A| + 2 links. Straightforward
computations show that only g2, with E(g2) = A ∪ {1 4, 4 3} is candidate to
be Nash. This network is not Nash since player 2 has an incentive to form a
link with player 3.
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4. We are now interested in networks which have |A| + 3 links. Straightforward
computations show that only g3, with E(g3) = A∪{1 4, 2 3, 4 3} and g4, with
E(g4) = A∪ {1 2, 2 3, 4 3} are candidates to be Nash. Network g3 is not Nash
since player 1 prefers network g4. Network g4 is not Nash since player 2 has
an incentive to delete the link 2 3.
5. We are now interested in the network with |A|+ 4 links which is a candidate
to be a Nash network. In this network, player 1 has an incentive to remove
the link 1 4.
!
0.1303
36
31
3
4
41
2
21
1
0.4
1
1
0.14
0.319
1
1
1
1
Figure 2:
Note that when we set the decay parameter δi,j = δi it is easy to show that a
Nash network always exists.
II. Characterization of Strict Nash Networks. Results regarding strict Nash
networks in this model are similar to what we find in the previous model. The exact
analogue of Theorem 1 can be written for this model. Similarly, we can reduce the
magnitude of the decay parameter and find a result equivalent to Proposition 3.4
4Details can be found in the working paper version: http:\\bus.lsu.edu\mcmillin\Working Papers\
pap10 04.pdf
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigate the implications of heterogeneity in the value parameter
and decay parameter in the connections model. We find that both types of hetero-
geneity are similar to cost heterogeneity in models of full transitivity, i.e. they
increase the size of strict Nash networks to the maximum possible and can lead to
non-existence of Nash networks. Moreover, value heterogeneity in the connections
model is different from value heterogeneity in the full transitivity model where it
does not dramatically increase the size of strict Nash networks, nor does it lead
to non-existence. Cost heterogeneity however has the same type of effect both in
models of full and partial transitivity.
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